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Food Policy: Its Role in Price
Stability and Food Security
CRISTINA C. DAVID*
Food price stability and food security issues have again be-
come central policy concerns, as prices of rice, corn, sugar,
chicken and other food commodities increased sharply in the
latter part of 1995. The sharp increases in food prices fueled
inflation, induced minimum wage increases, raised fears about
the nation's food security, and threatened macroeconomic stabil-
ity, as well as the political fortunes of the current administration.
In response, the government is adopting measures that will likely
waste scarce budgetary resources, be counterproductive over
the long term, and detract the country from the efficient path to
agricultural modernization.
As the price of rice rose, the government blamed and ha-
rassed the private traders, who have been in the business of rice
trading for decades through periods of low and high prices. The
government announced a doubling of budgetary allocation for
agriculture with no clear strategy for addressing the policy and
institutional constraints, developing more effective programs of
support services, and strengthening (and streamlining) the cen-
tral and local government bureaucracy concerned with agricul-
ture-related activities. The Irrigation Crisis Act, which waives
the normal public bidding procedure in irrigation construction,
is being fast-tracked, though this will likely exacerbate the prob-
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lems of corruption and ill-designed irrigation projects. The Food
Security Agenda proposed to expand the National Food
Authority's activities, further deepening government direct mar-
ket interventions.
The sharp increases in food prices since August of. 1995 have
raised concerns about the country's food security. And the popular
belief that food security and price stability can be best achieved
by having food self-sufficiency has again gained wide adher-
ence. It should be emphasized at the outset that price stability
per se is not directly, nor positively, related to degree of self-
sufficiency or trade balance2 Moreover, sustainable food secu-
rity (either through lower food prices and/or higher household
incomes) can only be achieved through a globally competitive
economy.
This paper argues that the sharp increases in prices of rice,
corn, and sugar have been caused largely by policy failures in
terms of both the choice of policy instrument and management
of that policy instrument. Crop production is inherently un-
stable because of the vagaries of nature -- typhoons, drought,
earthquakes, pest and diseases. And studies have already shown
that buffer stock operation is a more costly instrument for stabi-
lizing supply and prices than reliance on international trade.
However, to insulate the domestic market from extreme short-
run world price fluctuations, some form of variable import levy
or quantitative trade restrictions have often been used. In fact,
rice, corn, and sugar have long been subject to quantitative trade
restrictions. For rice, the government has monopoly control over
international trade and engages in domestic market operations
to defend farm support and/or ceiling prices. With the passage
1. Domestic price instability of exportable commodities is caused largely by fluctua-
tions in world prices and exchange rates. While trade policy instruments can easily
minimize the impact of sharp increases in world price or exchange rates, it is mucl'_ more
difficult to insulate domestic prices from sharp drops in world prices. Indeed, the
government can more easily stabilize domestic prices of importable commodities, such
as rice, corn, and sugar, through appropriate trade policy instruments, than coconut
which is exported. And reducing the seasonal and annual price fluctuations of essen-
tially nontraded food commodities such as eggplants, for example, through market
interventions is limited.DAVID: FOOD POLICY 173
of the Magna Carta of Small Farmers in the early 1990s, quanti-
tative trade controls were effectively imposed on all agricultural
commodities. It also increased the bureaucratic process of set-
ting allowable import levels as consultations with so-called farm-
ers' groups were required.
What then was the immediate cause of the price increases?
Trends in prices
Figure 1 shows the trends in the real price of rice, corn, and
sugar in the domestic and world market. It is clear that world
market conditions did not have much to do with the recent food
price crisis. Despite the reported tightening of the world grains
market, the 1995 world prices of rice, corn, and sugar in real
terms (deflated by US manufacturing unit value index) did not
significantly differ from their averages in the 1990s. World rice
price in real terms increased only by 2 percent, corn by 8 per-
cent, and sugar by -6 percent. In contrast, domestic price of rice
in real terms increased by 20 percent, corn by 28 percent, and
sugar by 10 percent between 1994 and 1995.
Seasonal price fluctuation was also unusually high during
1995 for rice and sugar as reported in Table 1. In 1995, retail
TABLE1
Degree of Seasonal Retail Price Fluctuations of
Rice, Corn, and Sugar, 1990-95
(Percent difference between highest and lowest price)
Ricea Corn Sugarb
1990 15 13 17
1991 4 3 3
1992 11 50 7
1993 26 14 9
1994 5 6 27
1995 70 23 40
a. Lowest price is typically during the early part of the year and
highestis in September or October.
b. Lowestandhighest pricesare typicallyin January and December.q
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FIGURE 1
Trends in Domestic and World Prices of Rice,
Corn, and Sugar in Real Terms, 1970-95"
*Domestic price refers to wholesale price deflatedby CPI for nonfood.DAVID: FOODPOLICY 175
i"
price of rice at its peak was 70 percent higher than in its lowest
price, compared to an average of only 12 percent between 1990
and 1994. For sugar, that percentage price difference in 1995
was 40 percent compared to an average of also 12 percent in the
previous years. For corn, that was also relatively high (23 per-
cent) compared to the average, but in 1992, it was even higher
(50 percent).
Nominal Protection Rates
In Figure 2, the absolute levels of domestic and border prices
in US dollars per ton from 1970 to 1995 are depicted. And the
percentage difference between domestic and border prices or the
nominal protection rates (NPR) are presented in Table 2. The trends
in NPRs indicate a growing protectionism of these three major
commodities. In 1995, the level of protection has become exces-
sive, particularly for corn (150 percent) and sugar (10 percent).
Rice price policy has historically been proconsumer as revealed
by the low NPR's. In fact, except for 1995, the book tariff rates
have been much higher than implicit tariffs resulting from gov-
ernment trade monopoly. Even the 16 percent to 19 percent NPR
between 1985 and 1994 simply offset the penalty imposed by the
overvaluation of the exchange rate. However, the NPR for rice
more than tripled to an average of 65 percent for 1995, and as
high as 100 percent in the latter part of the year.
Clearly, the government could have prevented the sharp in-
creases in food prices by allowing more imports. Not only were
imports too little, the timing of imports exacerbated the seasonal
price fluctuations, as has often been the case. Table 3 indicates
that imports of rice were too late. Whereas a major portion of
imports should have been in the country by the beginning of the
lean season in July, only 4 percent of total rice imports in 1995
arrived towards the end of that month. Of the total rice imports
between 1984 and 1993, an average of 45 percent arrived by
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FIGURE2
Trends in Domestic and World Prices (FOB + 15%) of.Rice,
Corn, and Sugar, 1970-95"
*Domestic price refers to wholesale price.DAVID: FOOD POLICY 177
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1.970-74 " 4 20 _36 -13
1975-79 -13 29 -13 2
1980-84 -13 26 37 62
1985-89 16 67 155 200
1.990-94 19 76 80 112
1995 65 150 104 . 141
a. Nominal protectionrateis thepercentagedifferencebetween domestic "
wholesaleprice andborderprice. Theborderprice is estimated as the
FOBworldprice plus 15 percent to cover insurance and freight.
b. Borderpricerefers to the FOBworld priceplus 15 percent under the
assumption that sugar is importable.
c. Borderprice is FOBworld price assurnulg sugar is exportable.
TABLE3
Cumulative Distribution of Rice Imports from
July to October, 1984 to 1995 (Selected Years)
July August September October Total imports
(cumulaltive '%imports) (000 rot)
1984 43 61 72 92 191
1985 48 64 74 86 540
1988 61 94 100 - .181
1989 28 50 100 - 220
1990 60 74 94 96 622
1993 31. 40 74 100 210
1995 4 43 66 100 240
Import Patterns
There is a common belief that food security can only be
achieved by being self-sufficient, at least in grains. Hence, the gov-
ernment is often reluctant to increase food imports not only due
to political pressure from producers, but also perhaps to avoid
exacerbating fears of the public about the country's food security.178 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
(
Were the 1995 food imports usually high? Table 4 (Figures 3,
4 and 5) shows the level of imports and its proportion to domes-
tic production for rice and corn since the 1970s. Not so well-
known is the fact that rice and corn imports in 1995 were rela-
tively low both in absolute terms and in relation to domestic
production. Imports of rice were only 240,000 metric tons as
compared to the high of almost 600,000 mt in 1993, 540,000 mt
in 1985 and 450,000 mt way back in 1972. Indeed, rice imports
as a proportion of domestic production was only 3 percent in :
1995 compared to a high of 14 percent in 1972 and an average
of 10 percent in the prewar period, and 5 to 6 percent in the
1960s and 1970s. Imports of corn in 1995 amounted to only
135,000 mt representing 3 percent of domestic production. In
contrast, corn imports were 528,000 mt (17 percent) of produc-
tion in 1983 and 343,000 mt (7 percent) in 1990. Between 1991
and 1994, imports of corn were insignificant. Imports of sugar
have also been, thus far, relatively small - about 3 percent of
domestic production in the few years that sugar imports were
allowed.
Production Performance
Although this paper argues that appropriate trade policies
could have easily prevented the food price instability in 1997,
attention must be given to the causes of the poor growth perfor-
mance of the agricultural sector since the 1980s. in previous
studies, competitive advantage of agriculture was reported to
have been declining as evidenced by the declining world market
shares of major agricultural exports and increasing domestic
resource cost of rice production.
In Table 5 (and Figures 6, 7, and 8), the growth rates (and
trends of) of production, area, and yield of rice, corn, and sugar
also reveal disturbing trends, particularly for corn and sugar.
Corn production was declining in absolute terms during the
past three consecutive years, mainly because of substantial de-
creases inthe crop area. Sugar production has been on a long-
term downtrend since the 1970s as area planted to sugar de-
clined and yields stagnated. Growth rate of rice production hasDAVID: FOOD POLICY 179
TABLE 4
Trends in Imports, Ratio of Imports to Production,
and Ratio of Exports to Production of
Rice, Corn, and Sugar, 1970-95
Rice Nets Imports Corn Imports Sugar Imports Sugar Exports
000t % of 000t % of O00t % of 000t % of
Production Production Production Production
1970 -2 -0.1 1 - 0 0 1225 65.0
1971 379 11.1 55 2.7 0 0 141 7.3
1972 451 13.6 160 7.5 0 0 1224 59.5
1973 308 8.8 7 - 0 0 1589 64.4
1974 165 4.6 16 0.6 0 0 950 42.9
1975 147 3.5 16 0.6 0 0 1074 36.8
1976 55 1.3 12 - 0 0 2149 80.1
1977 -15 -0.3 148 5.2 0 0 1590 66.1
1978 47 -1.0 105 3.7 0 0 998 43.6
1979 -127 -2.5 35 1.2 0 0 1619 71.5
1980 -231 4.6 250 8.2 0 0 1541 66.5
1981 -83 -1.6 253 7.7 0 0 1106 45.7
1982 0 -0 341 10.0 0 0 1214 49.3
1983 -40 -0.8 528 16.9 0 0 861 36.9
1984 190 3.7 182 5.6 0 0 877 51.0
1985 541 9.5 281 7.3 0 0 278 18.3
1986 0 0 - - 0 0 156 11.7
1987 0 0 56 1.3 44 3.2 146 10.5
1988 151 2.7 25 0.6 59 3.7 181 11.4
1989 209 3.4 154 3.4 0 0 275 15.7
1990 593 9.8 343 7.1 0 0 312 18.1
1991 -10 -0.2 - - 0 0 172 8.6
1992 -30 -0.5 - - 0 0 265 12.9
1993 210 3.4 - - 0 0 272 15.0
1994 0 0.0 - - 53 32 150 9.1
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FIGURE 3
Annual Rice imports (a) and Its Ratio to _
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FIGURE 5
Annual Sugar Exports (a) and Its Ratio to _i
Domestic Production (b), 1970-95
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TABLE 5
Growth Rates of Production Area, and Yield of
Rice, Corn and Sugar, 1960-95
1960-65 1965-80 1980-90 1990-95
Rice
Production 2.1 4.6 2.2 2.1
F Area 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.1
__ Yield 0.5 3.4 2.0 0.9
i Corn
Production 1.9 6.4 4.7 -0.9
Area -0.6 4.3 1.8 -5.6
Yield 2.5 2.0 2.9 4.9
t Sugar
Production -2.3* -4.5 0.3
. Area -2.8 -4.4 2.6 !
Yield -1.1 0.6 -2.3
t.
F_ *Refers to 1973-1980.
been below population growth rate since the 1980s, and its yield
__ growth has also been declining since the Green Revolution pe-
jt riod. Clearly, the growing price protection on these commodities
has not reversed the declining performance of these crops. r-
Immediate Cause of Price Instability
F The nature of food price crisis in the mid-1970s was quite
k different from that of 1995 because the root causes were beyond
government control. World prices of food grains, sugar, coconut,
and fertilizers increased two- to threefold. At the same time,
_ domestic rice production dropped by nearly 20 percent because
of tungro infestation as well as climatic factors.
In 1995, the food price crisis was largely induced by policy
._ failure. Obviously, there was no intent on the part of the govern-
ment to let food prices increase as much. Either it did not have the
right information or analysis of the demand and supply situation,
t and/or it did not make the proper decision on import levels.
Although the error in the level and timing of imports committed
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FIGURE 6
Trends in Rice Production Area and Yield, 1970-95
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Trends in Sugar Production Area and Yield, 1970-95DAVID: FOOD POLICY 187
_" ..... in 1995 was perhaps the most serious in postwar history, such
_ problems have often been experienced in the past. For example,
_" Bouis's (1983) study of the rice price from 1961 to 1974 concluded
that
abnormal seasonal price rises were not primarily caused by rice
b. traders' monopolistic behavior, as often charged. Rather, fluctua-
tions in seasonal prices were in large part the result of ineffective
government management of its rice importing and buffer stock
operations. In attempting to control the average price, government
intervention resulted in more seasonal price variation than would
have been the case in the absence of government intervention. b
Moreover, a more recent study of Umali (1990) for the pe-
riod of 1974 to 1986 reported that:
_..
a) government price stabilization was reasonably successful in
li" enforcing the rice ceiling price, but less successful in main- taining the paddy support price;
b) the degree of spatial price integration improved as govern-
k- merit intervention declined;
! c) regional markets were intertemporally price efficient;
d) credit market segmentation (i.e., higher cost for small vs. large
K.. borrowers) forced farmers to rely on informal credit sources
_ and the high cost of capital from this sector has made any
_t. marketing strategy other than harvest time sale of paddy un-
profitable for farmers; and
L_ e) the paddy trading and retail level markets were competitive,
i_ but the structure of milling industry and the government policy
L creating barriers to entry both worked against competition at
_. the mill level.
Concluding Remarks
It is ironic that government trade policy set in 1995 has in
effect become more protectionist, just as the government for-
maUy joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Membership
I in the WTO involves the commitment to dismantle quantitative
;,C trade barriers and reduce the level of trade protection over time,
_ except in the case of rice for the next 10 years. However, none of
!_ ..
i,
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the commitments with respect to agriculture have been imple-
mented. Moreover, the Department of Agriculture proposed the _-
imposition of a 100 tariff on commodities where quantitative
trade barriers will be lifted, such as corn, sugar, pork, chicken,
etc. Up until 1994, that rate was even higher than implicit tariff
rates resulting from quantitative trade restrictions for most of
those sensitive commodities.
The highly protectionist position regarding tariffs on sensi-
tive agricultural commodities taken by the DA was presumably
due to political pressures from producers' groups. Yet, the food
price crisis of 1995 illustrated that such a highly protectignist
stance for agriculture is not, in fact, politically tenable at the
current level of economic development. 2 Furthermore, the exces-
sive protection on selected importable food commodities will
raise the degree of peso overvaluation, hurting many poor farm-
ers growing exportable agricultural commodities. Such a policy
is also antipoor because the majority of the poor both in urban
and rural areas are net buyers of food and depend on employ-
ment in livestock and food processing where corn and sugar are
major inputs.
Assuming that the government will retain its monopoly on
rice imports or use quantitative trade restrictions, the focus of
efforts must be on improving the forecasting of domestic rice
production, consumption, and the world market situation, as
well as the decision process in rice importations. The current
proposals on rice reserves and inventory requirements have not
been based on rigorous analysis of benefits and costs. Moreover,
stock data by commercial traders and households are very weak
and inherently difficult to collect.
To minimize gross errors in the timing and amount of rice
importations and still recognize the volatility of the world mar-
ket, quantitative trade controls may be retained but the right to
import must be genuinely bidded out, without giving any advan-
tage to any groups (cooperatives or not). In this way, the gov-
2. Only in developed countries can a highly protectionist food policy be sustained
for a prolonged period of time.
..aWDAVID: FOOD POLICY 189
ernment may supplement its market knowledge from official
forecast by the bid price. When the bid price becomes too high,
meaning the planned imports are too low, import quantities
may be revised upward.
In this way, the government does not get directly involved in T
the importations. And proceeds from the bid price of the right to
import (effectively an import levy) can be budgeted for the
strengthening of support services. With the current procedure,
profits or rents from rice importation are dissipated by high
administrative cost and graft and corruption.